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PRIVACY, POLICE POWER, AND THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC
POWER IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: A NOT SO
UNLIKELY COEXISTENCE
CAROL NACKENOFF ∗
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.1
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. 2
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published The Right to Privacy in
the Harvard Law Review in 1890 because they were concerned that the
modern era provided inadequate safeguards for protection of the private
realm and the “right to one’s personality.” 3 With the emerging recognition
of a “man’s spiritual nature,” feelings, and intellect, came the
acknowledgement of “the right to enjoy life—the right to be let alone.” 4
Brandeis and Warren argued that if thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal protection, that the common law was beautifully capable of
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1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207.
4. Id. at 195. The authors cite Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the
Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract for the concept of the right “to be let alone.” From
the 1880 edition: “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be
let alone.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & Company, 1880).
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growing to afford such protections, and judges could “afford the requisite
protection, without the interposition of the legislature.”5 The notion of
battery, for example, was expanded to offer “a qualified protection of the
individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and
excessive vibration,” and the law of nuisance developed. 6 The common
law was vibrant, useful, and far from dead.
Influential from the time it was published at the outset of the
Progressive Era, the Warren and Brandeis article was a harbinger of a new
wave of concern for personal privacy and for legal protections thereof. It is
noteworthy—but not surprising—that this escalating interest in the right to
be let alone developed alongside expanded use of common and statutory
law to extend state power over children, juveniles, and families of poor and
working class residents and citizens, as well as over Native American
families and others who were seen as economically dependent, vulnerable,
or irresponsible. Eileen McDonagh has even characterized the Progressive
Era as an era of negative civil rights, with legislatures actively curtailing the
civil rights of particular groups. 7 Ken Kersch argues that progressive
reformers did not so much discover individual rights, as displace and
marginalize pre-existing rights claims with their own (and constitutionally
enshrined) rights conceptions. 8 He further points to “the tension at the heart
of liberal political cultures between their animating commitment to the
prerogative of the individual concerning his conscience and his choices, and
the recognition . . . that the essence of government is to guide and to
coerce.” 9 At certain times, the question of when it is justifiable to coerce
individuals—because of perceived reform imperatives and perceived
threats—in order to protect or advance public morals becomes highly
politicized, implicating the boundaries between public and private.10 And,
“[a]s a practical matter, these arguments will often be subsumed within
arguments about law, be it (judge-made) common, statutory, or
constitutional.” 11 The Progressive Era was just such a period of
contestation, involving redefinition of public and private. 12

5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
6. Id. at 194.
7. Eileen L. McDonagh, The “Welfare Rights State” and the “Civil Rights State”: Policy
Paradox and State Building in the Progressive Era, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 225, 236 (1993).
8. KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004).
9. Ken I. Kersch, The Right to Privacy, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 217
(David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., rev. & expanded ed. 2008).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Carol Nackenoff, The Private Roots of American Political Development: The
Immigrants’ Protective League’s “Friendly and Sympathetic Touch,” 1908–1924, 28 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 129 (2014); see also Kersch, supra note 9, at 217–19, 240.
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Despite the near-certainty of many progressive activists that acute
social and economic problems would yield to advances in the social
sciences and social ethics, there was pushback from those who had differing
understandings of rights, whether parental rights or rights of business
owners. 13 Contestation between groups over the redefinition of boundaries
between public and private is hardly surprising. However, the fact that
Brandeis both supported many progressive initiatives that might be seen as
privacy-limiting and was also an early leader in the call for more privacy
rights begs for further investigation. According to Neil Richards,
Brandeis’s views evolved, and he changed his mind about privacy and free
speech after co-authoring The Right to Privacy. 14 However, in David
Bernstein’s assessment, Brandeis was “far from a consistent civil
libertarian” when viewed from the position of those living in post-Warren
Court America. For Bernstein, Brandeis was “a transitional figure in
writing opinions that served as a bridge between the statist Progressives of
the early twentieth-century and mid-century legal liberals.” 15 I contend that
it is productive to consider the nature of the balance Brandeis struck, not
only because it provides clues into the worldviews of a subset of
progressive reformers, but also because it reveals something more about
how distinctions between public and private were being drawn—
distinctions with legacies.
The intersection of new governmental capacities and new conceptions
of rights must be closely interrogated in any attempt to understand changing
notions of private and public in this period. How were changing
borderlands between private and public understood, and what was the role
of common law, criminal law, and constitutional law in policing them,
given that the progressive agenda of reform included expanding the role of
the state?
Acknowledging the existence of different strains within progressivism
can help when thinking about tensions between rights, including rights to a
private sphere and a private self: Walter Weyl was not Jane Addams, and
Woodrow Wilson was not Theodore Roosevelt. This much is true, but
insufficient for our purposes. Progressive reform did not love unalloyed
appeals to rights, despite Brandeis’s defense of privacy rights.
13. See DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 430 (2013) (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 30–31 (1910)); see also JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL
ETHICS (1902). On resistance to the reform agenda, see Kathleen S. Sullivan & Carol Nackenoff,
Family Matters as Public Work: Reformers’ Dreams for the Progressive Era Juvenile Court,
American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303396; KERSCH, supra note 8, at ch.2; Kersch, supra note 9.
14. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295,
1298–99 (2010).
15. David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a
Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2014).
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The recognition of a private sphere that was insulated from state
oversight or intrusion depended on a judgment about what kind of citizen
the judges, legislators, or public administrators confronted. While Warren
and Brandeis spoke of “inviolate personality” or the “right to one’s
personality” in universal terms, they seemed to rely upon particular notions
of moral personhood. 16 This Paper considers the development of privacy
alongside robust rationales for state intrusions on what opponents saw as
family or individual prerogatives—matters of the private sphere—during
the waning years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the
twentieth. William Novak argued that “on the whole, the law and language
of individual rights were not antagonistic to state building,” but he
nevertheless thought that the “uneasy alliance of state and individual, power
and liberty” was held together by the displacement of common law by
constitutionalism in the twentieth century. 17 I suggest, instead, that the
displacement may not have been so clean, leaving boundary issues between
public and private unresolved in a number of arenas even in the early
twenty-first century.
I. REFORM: THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW, POLICE POWERS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The growth of the state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries is generally studied as the expansion of the federal government
and its administrative apparatus. States and courts are cast as losers as
power was wrested away from these traditional sources of authority during
political struggles. 18 While such an account marginalizes courts as
backward-looking impediments to progress, loathed by many reformers of
the era, many progressive legal scholar-activists saw the judiciary’s role as
crucial. 19 And they were not wrong. A number of important social welfare
reforms began with the courts at the state and municipal level.20 Lawyers
and law school faculty, including such high profile figures such as Roscoe
16. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205, 207 (respectively).
17. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 245 (1996).
18. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982) for the fullest treatment of this
thesis.
19. This was especially true with the juvenile court and new, specialized courts. See
ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF
JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA (1998); VICTORIA GETIS, THE JUVENILE
COURT AND THE PROGRESSIVES (2000); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE
MAKING (2004); MICHAEL WILRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE
ERA CHICAGO (2003); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
20. Carol Nackenoff & Kathleen S. Sullivan, The House that Julia (and Friends) Built:
Networking Chicago’s Juvenile Court, in STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS 171–202 (Carol
Nackenoff & Julie Novkov eds., 2014); Sullivan & Nackenoff, supra note 13.
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Pound, Ernst Freund, Julian Mack, and Louis Brandeis, were active in
reform movements. They saw room for the common law, police powers,
and constitutional law to lead the way in adapting the law to changing
circumstances.
The courts were not, in their view, necessarily legislating from the
bench, for “it is not the application of an existing principle to new cases, but
the introduction of a new principle, which is properly termed judicial
legislation.” 21
Nor was judicial legislation viewed as necessarily
illegitimate:
This power has been constantly exercised by our judges, when
applying to a new subject principles of private justice, moral
fitness, and public convenience. Indeed, the elasticity of our law,
its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for growth, which
has enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing society and
to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been
its greatest boast.22
The common law has protected privacy in certain cases for well over a
century, and granting the protections suggested here would merely be a
further application of an existing rule. 23 As Warren and Brandeis noted:
“The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle,
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its
commands.” 24 Although Warren and Brandeis conceded that the boundary
lines between consideration of “the dignity and convenience of the
individual” and “the demands of the public welfare” could not be clearly
drawn in advance of experience, they laid out several general principles for
determining such boundaries, and for establishing when private rights of
action for invasion of privacy would be warranted. 25
Brandeis was long a supporter of progressive reforms that extended the
government’s reach into what some business owners and members of the
public viewed as the realm of private decisionmaking. He was especially
concerned with modern technology and its capacity for intrusion into the
private sphere, including the proclivity of the press to expose the private
affairs of individuals for sensational and prurient interests.26 Newspapers
could therefore debase tastes and cause blight and injury. 27 Warren and
Brandeis worried about the privacy of artists, writers, and collectors, as well

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 214–20.
See Richards, supra note 14, at 1303–04, 1306, 1339; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.

2015]

A NOT SO UNLIKELY COEXISTENCE

317

as the privacy of persons of substance—especially those who were not
candidates for public office. 28
While on the Supreme Court of the United States, Brandeis did not
suppose that only common law protections for privacy were available;
sometimes, there were constitutional protections. Brandeis concluded as
early as 1920 that state infringement of rights guaranteed protection by the
United States Constitution should be reachable through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 29
Meyer v. Nebraska 30 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 31 reveal some of
the situations in which the boundary cut in the direction of rights
protection. 32 In these cases, the Court concluded that the state has an
interest in the physical, mental, and moral improvement of its citizens, an
interest in fostering a people with American ideals, and an interest in
teachers being patriotic and of good moral character, but individuals
nevertheless retain certain fundamental rights.33 The state may certainly
compel school attendance and regulate the curriculum, and may even
require that English be taught, but barring instruction in a foreign language
exceeds the power of the state.34 Nor could a state bar parental decisions to
educate their children in private and parochial schools on the grounds that it
slowed immigrant assimilation and provided inferior English language
instruction. 35 Brandeis’s understanding of privacy extended to thoughts,
beliefs, emotions, and sensations, which was consistent with his
concurrence in Whitney v. California, 36 that the free exchange of ideas is
vital to democracy. 37
28. Id. at 195–99, 215; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 99–101 (2009).
29. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 619 (citing Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
30. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
32. Justice McReynolds authored Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. Pierce
was unanimous, but Justice Holmes (joined by Justice Sutherland) dissented in Meyer. For Justice
Holmes (in an argument that also extended to Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923), decided
the same day), it was not unreasonable for Nebraska or Iowa to require that a student should hear
or speak only English at school; the state’s measures were reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest and did not unduly restrict the liberty of teachers or scholars.
33. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02.
34. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402–03.
35. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
36. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
37. Id. at 373. Brandeis concurred with the majority only because the record below failed to
raise the question of whether Whitney’s actions constituted “clear and imminent danger,” and the
Court could not, in his view, raise the issue. This failure to raise the issue warranted
governmental interference with Whitney’s rights of speech and assembly. Citing Meyer and
Pierce, among others, for the proposition that the right of free speech, the right to teach, and the
right of assembly are fundamental, Brandeis continued, “[b]ut, although the rights of free speech
and assembly are fundamental, they are not, in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to
restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State from
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Constitutional protections, too, evolve beyond the evils that gave rise
to them, and Brandeis helped extend them. He came to regard the Fourth
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable search and seizures and the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination as integrally linked to
privacy. 38 In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 39 Brandeis contended
that wiretapping telephone conversations to pursue violators of the National
Prohibition Act was a breach of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment’s
protections of “the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”40
Quoting Weems v. United States’s language that “[t]ime works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes,” Brandeis argued that
the right to be protected against government espionage or searches warrants
broad construction. 41
He reasoned that “[t]he makers of our
Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.” 42
One of the key questions in the right to privacy debate was what was
of public or general interest. This question was central to the Warren and
Brandeis analysis of when the right to publish trumped the right to privacy.
Stipulating what was of public interest, and why, was also central to the
rationale progressives developed for removing children from dangerous
home environments, for compulsory education, for limiting child labor, and
for limiting work hours for women. As an attorney, Brandeis had a hand in
developing these arguments. He was enlisted by the National Consumer’s
League to defend Oregon’s law imposing an eight-hour limit for women in
court. 43 From that victory, he and Josephine Goldmark repeated the process
in other states. 44 Brandeis worked with progressive reformers in defense of
minimum wage and maximum hours legislation, as well as other reform
causes. 45 He supported workers’ efforts to unionize and believed business
destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.” He pointed to Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), for the proposition about limits on rights. See PHILIPPA STRUM,
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 306–07 (1984); Philippa Strum, Brandeis, Louis
D. 1856–1941, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 188, 190
(David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008).
38. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 630.
39. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). Justice Holmes and Justice Stone joined Justice Brandeis’ dissent. Justice Butler filed a
separate dissent.
41. Id. at 472–73 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
42. Id. at 478.
43. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 248 (1946).
44. See NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN
WORKERS, 1890S–1990S, at 87–89 (2015).
45. On the range of reform causes with which Brandeis was associated, see UROFSKY, supra
note 28, at 331, and Strum, supra note 37, at 188–91. See also Justice Holmes’s dissent, which
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had an obligation to be socially responsible, all while refusing to be paid for
his services on behalf of the public.46 The police power, even if not always
named, was frequently the vehicle for asserting the power of the state over
such matters of public concern.
II. WHEN A MAN’S HOME IS NOT HIS CASTLE
Household governance had historically been viewed as private
governance; therefore the question of under what circumstances the state
could exercise internal authority over members of the household
necessitated changes in this public-private relationship. The King’s duty to
maximize the welfare of the realm—his household, in effect—included
using his authority as pater patriae through disciplinary measures.
Restraining pernicious vices that endangered the public was considered part
of this power. 47 Juvenile court proponents invoked this power, calling it
parens patriae, to remove juveniles from the criminal justice system and
work for their rehabilitation in a less rule-bound and more fatherly
(motherly?) court system. 48
Roscoe Pound received great attention in the initial years of the
twentieth century for his assertions that the social interest required state
protection. The sovereign, he wrote, is “the guardian of social interests,”
and “[a]s social institutions, state and law exist for social ends, and from the
beginning have recognized and secured individual interests as a means
thereto”; but “the law does not secure individuals in the free exercise of
their faculties for the purpose of injuring others, since obvious social
interests are opposed to such a claim.” 49
The overemphasis on
individualism in American common law, Pound argued, “exaggerates
private right at the expense of public right,” contrary to the interest of the

Justice Brandeis joined, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), arguing that
Congress has the power to regulate child labor.
46. Strum, supra note 37, at 188–91.
47. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 58 (2005) on Blackstone and Chapter 2, generally, on Blackstone’s
Police.
48. Mack, supra note 19. A good part of this defense of pater patriae would be rejected by
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), with Justice Abe Fortas writing for the majority and making
explicit the Court’s rejection of Mack’s rationale, where the individual rights of juveniles were
increasingly held to require the formal protections afforded the accused by the Bill of Rights. I
note “motherly” because the principal architects of the juvenile court in Chicago were female;
Pound and Mack worked with these female reformers. Freund worked extensively with another
female-led reform project, the Immigrants’ Protective League, and its chief architect, Grace
Abbott.
49. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 345, 347, 362
(respectively) (1915).
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modern community. 50 Society needs—and the public wants—protection
against individuals and the excesses of individualism. 51
At the turn of the twentieth century, there was a rather pervasive view
that state exercises of police power were beyond constitutional scrutiny in
the United States. State exercises of police power were viewed as policy
measures; only by reclassifying them as criminal could substantive and
procedural criminal law or constitutional law reach them. 52 As Martin
Dubber noted, “the police concept can immunize state acts inconsistent with
basic principles of substantive and procedural criminal law.”53 During the
early years of the twentieth century, until Hammer v. Dagenhart 54 restricted
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, the federal government
also enacted morals legislation through its commerce power. There was
only so much the states could do to police on their own. In Champion v.
Ames, 55 the Supreme Court upheld the federal regulation of traffic in lottery
tickets by a narrow majority. The Court reasoned that “we should hesitate
long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on
through interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power
competent to that end.” 56 In practice, “the federal government enjoyed
wide ranging police powers, of which the power to police immigrants as
threats to the public police was but one example.”57
But in the early twentieth century, the police power was quite illdefined. 58 Ernst Freund wrote in his classic treatment of the subject that
“[t]he term police power, while in constant use and indispensable in the
vocabulary of American constitutional law, has remained without
authoritative or generally accepted definition.”59 After inventorying ways
in which the term is used in Blackstone’s Commentaries, Freund noted that
“the general tendency is to identify it with the whole of internal government

50. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909). The overemphasis on
individualism in American common law was also “hostile to legislation.” Id.
51. RABBAN, supra note 13, at 433–35 (citing, among other sources, Roscoe Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 403 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19
GREEN BAG 607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 AM. L. REV. 811,
815 (1911)).
52. DUBBER, supra note 47, at 137–38.
53. Id. at 143.
54. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
55. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
56. Id. at 357–58 (Harlan, J.); see also JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 130–32 (2014).
57. DUBBER, supra note 47, at 143.
58. Id. at 120.
59. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iii
(1904).
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and sovereignty, and to regard it as an undefined mass of legislation.”60
Freund quite notably defined police power as “the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.” 61 The police power “aims directly to secure and promote the
public welfare, and it does so by restraint and compulsion”; it is not a fixed
quantity but elastic, and capable of development.62 Freund’s definition of
police power included the regulation of work hours, compulsory school
attendance, restraints on the employment of children, and restraints upon
parental rights of control over delinquent children. These examples come
only from his discussion of control of dependents. 63 The police power
clearly stood in opposition to the right to be let alone.64
Police power in the earlier years of the nation allowed for the
regulation of public morals, preservation of order, and maintenance of
standards of decency. It has been commonly argued that, “legal support for
morals restriction barely wavered in the nineteenth century.” 65 Morals
nuisance legislation (for example, against disorderly houses) and anti-liquor
legislation were pervasive, and by the 1850s, in order to deal with such
traditional moral evils, state courts had defined state police powers quite
broadly. 66 Historian William Novak argued that there is a difference
between nineteenth- and twentieth-century morals regulation: “[O]nly after
twentieth-century constitutional innovations like privacy and civil liberties
could one expect anything remotely approaching laissez-faire or caveat
emptor in morals.” 67 Although Warren and Brandeis argued that, at the end
of the nineteenth century, common law generally recognized that “a man’s
house is his castle,” that was not the reality. 68 The house was not—and
would not become—the quintessentially private sphere that the authors

60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at iii.
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 248–58.
64. See David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the
Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 147–48 (1990), for a contrast
between Tiedeman’s earlier understanding of police power as warranted only because it enlarged
or protected individual liberty and Freund’s view that police power was an infringement on
individual liberty.
65. NOVAK, supra note 17, at 151. But see infra note 66, for criticism of the breadth of
Novak’s claim.
66. NOVAK, supra note 17, at 156; COMPTON, supra note 56, at 84–89. Compton argues,
however, that many scholars of the nineteenth century, including Novak, overstate the judiciary’s
affinity for non-traditional types of morals legislation. Id. at 6–8. For the development of
constitutional arguments at the state and federal level protecting moral minorities during this same
period, see KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2014).
67. NOVAK, supra note 17, at 156.
68. Id. at 157.
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described. 69 The salus populi tradition was one that permitted communities
to “defend themselves aggressively by imposing stringent requirements of
orderliness on all spaces and activities.” 70 And arguably, there would not
follow any clean break with a tradition of morals regulation.
Progressive reformers, including Roscoe Pound, who became famous
for arguing that the common law needed to change to become better attuned
to the times, often justified their concern in terms of growing public
sympathy for the “underdog.” 71 By the first decade of the twentieth
century, a marked movement for judicial reform was underway—to
dispense justice, courts needed to be modern, efficient, and fair to the poor
and vulnerable. Pound’s paper about the court system delivered before the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1906 became a rallying cry for
reform and prompted the ABA to recommend a set of changes that included
improvement in the administration of the courts. 72 Pound, noting that “real
and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law . . . exists
in the United States today,” declared that “our system of courts is archaic
and our procedure behind the times.” 73 The modernization of the urban
court system—of which the Cook County juvenile court stood for Pound as
a fine example—brought new assumptions, concerns, and state practices to
bear in what Pound called “the socialization of law.” 74 This process
involved “adjusting the law, shaped by the individualism of the past three
centuries, to the ideal of social justice of the twentieth century.” 75 Pound
criticized courts for mechanical reasoning, but the judicial elites he
addressed were generally quite receptive to calls for the courts to address
social and economic ills. 76 Dean John Henry Wigmore of Northwestern
University, who had hired Pound in 1907, noted in 1917 that common law
judges were constantly making law, and “our own Supreme Courts have
long been drawing copiously and consciously from this unbounded field of

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 50–51 (1997).
72. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 79 (1994).
73. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
10 CRIME & DELINQ. 355, 356, 365 (respectively) (1964) reprinted from Transactions of the
Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, August 29, 1906.
74. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
CHICAGO xxxii (2003). The Illinois Legislature enacted the Juvenile Court bill in 1899 and
amended the law several times in its first decade at the behest of reformers. But reformers sought
change through informal invention as well. See Nackenoff & Sullivan, supra note 20.
75. Roscoe Pound, Story Professor of Law in Harvard University, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
COURTS: AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE LAW ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA 7 (1913).
76. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING 32–33 (2010).
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public policy.” 77 Reform of the legal system helped enable courts to play
an important role in developing new conceptions of rights and warrants for
government intrusions of the home.
Hull-House-influenced reformers who had pressed for the formation of
the juvenile court after experimenting with reforms in Chicago, and then
helped spread the gospel to the rest of the country, were especially
determined to include immigrants and the working class in participatory
democratic ventures; civic knowledge grew only as they shaped goals
together. The juvenile court and other specialized courts designed in this
period were supposed to learn, change, and grow through interaction with
those the institutions served. 78 Pragmatism required flexibility.
III. WHAT KIND OF RIGHTS SERVED PROGRESSIVE REFORM INTERESTS?
The kind of legal flexibility many of these progressive reformers
sought in order to develop dynamic, iterative responses to social problems
was more easily found through appeals to police power and development of
the common law than through statutory authority that was often difficult to
revisit and amend. This conclusion, however, may not have been clear to
those pragmatist reformers who hoped that statutory law and administrative
procedures could develop in more flexible and participatory directions.
Additionally, the language of social good and social progress was steeped
in a vision of a larger community interest. Individualism, or expressions of
individual self-interest, were deemed outmoded and unsuited to goals for
new, twentieth-century citizenship.79
A bright-line conception of
constitutional rights based on individual self-interest and a right to be let

77. Id. at 73; HULL, supra note 71, at 65–66.
78. Carol Nackenoff, Toward a More Inclusive Community: The Legacy of Female
Reformers in the Progressive State, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE (Bruce Ackerman,
Stephen Engel & Stephen Skowronek eds., forthcoming 2016). Pound served for several years on
Chicago’s Juvenile Court Committee. For more information on Pound’s association with Hull
House and the Juvenile Court Committee, see, e.g., HULL, supra note 71, at 72. The New York
juvenile court was different in that children and adolescents were not removed from the criminal
court system, but rather given probation. Shortly after the New York statute was enacted, Judge
Julian Mack wrote of the distinctions in 1909. The New York model works:
[B]y suspending sentence and releasing the child but under probation, or, in case of
removal from the home, sending it to a school instead of to a jail or penitentiary. The
criminal proceeding remains, however. The child is charged with the commission of a
definite offense, of which it must be found either guilty or not guilty. If not guilty of
the one certain act, it is discharged, however much it may need care or supervision. If
guilty, it is then dealt with but as a criminal.
Mack, supra note 19, at 108; see also John P. Woods, New York’s Juvenile Offender Law: An
Overview and Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1980).
79. Carol Nackenoff, New Politics for New Selves: Jane Addams’s Legacy for Democratic
Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, in JANE ADDAMS AND THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY,
119 (Marilyn Fischer, Carol Nackenoff & Wendy Chmielewski eds., 2009).
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alone, then, was not consistent with the kind of flexibility that good,
progressive policymaking sought.
The fact that progressive reform did not love unalloyed appeals to
rights suggests a few possibilities. First, a balancing approach to rights
might more easily permit the government to advance important social
welfare and police power interests (especially at the state level) than would
a fundamental rights approach. Second, the notion of a “person” who is
entitled to privacy may not include everyone. Third, if one’s home is one’s
castle, it is also likely that not everyone had a proper “home.” Any of these
possibilities could help us make sense of how a number of progressive
reformers, Brandeis among them, understood public-private boundaries.
The fact that neither Brandeis nor any other liberal justice dissented
from Justice Holmes’s 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell 80 suggests that these
possibilities merit serious consideration. In his famous Olmstead dissent,
just prior to a much more famous quote that appears earlier in this Paper,
Brandeis remarked on Buck:
We have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of
Government, like those embodied in the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United
States or the States from meeting modern conditions by
regulations which “a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. 81
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments prohibited warrantless telephone
wire taps because they violated privacy rights, but as Justice Holmes wrote
in Buck:
[T]he public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their
lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence.82
Government intervention in bodily integrity was not necessarily an
unwarranted foray into the private sphere—there were competing social
considerations. There seemed to be no elevated scrutiny of decisions made
public officials about the public welfare in this sphere. It cannot be, then,
that the right to be let alone was understood as a hard barrier against
80. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Holmes majority opinion was joined by, among others,
Brandeis, Taft, and Stone. Only Justice Pierce Butler dissented. Victoria Nourse notes Brandeis’s
silence in Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 101, 112
(2013).
81. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). Brandeis wrote this segment
of the dissent only for himself. He also joined a dissent written by Justice Holmes, in which
Justices Stone and Butler also joined.
82. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (Holmes, J.).
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measures seen as promoting what progressive reformers understood as
social welfare measures. The long public tradition of regulating moral
nuisances in the name of a well-regulated society 83 found continuing
expression in a generous—and sometimes remarkably implicit—acceptance
of certain exercises of police power.
“Home” had a moral dimension to Progressive Era reformers. Much
like their predecessors and successors, they sought to police homes of those
who had come to the attention of public agencies and courts. For earlier
generations, disorder authorized public action; the welfare of the people, the
common law of nuisance, and the expectation that an owner would use his
or her own so as not to injure another all supported that conclusion. 84 But
the nineteenth century authorization of public regulation did not simply
disappear with the rise of privacy concerns and constitutional protections
thereof. Not everyone enjoyed the same level of protection.
Juvenile court probation officers in the early years of the twentieth
century, for example, visited the homes of young people, collecting data
and working to purge the home environment of harmful influences.85
Beyond offering friendly guidance, probation officers helped procure
services for the family and also functioned somewhat like latter-day social
workers. 86 They could attempt to relocate family residences to remove
temptations and unhealthy influences on the young. In extreme cases, they
could insist upon removal of the child from the home. 87 Evidence suggests
that such removals were far more common in the case of African American
children than white ones. Mothers’ pensions, administered by juvenile
courts, were also more likely to be awarded to white mothers to keep the
family intact. 88 Workers in the juvenile court system were not the only
ones allowed to intervene in homes and residential spaces. The Chicagobased Immigrants’ Protective League, wielding quasi-public powers,
attempted to make sure that young women arriving in Chicago were only
released into the hands of responsible relatives, and not lodged in co-ed
boarding houses. 89 They sent “friendly visitors” to follow up with repeat
visits. 90 These boarding houses could pose dangers to the young, and to

83. NOVAK, supra note 17, at 156–57.
84. Id. at 157.
85. SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE
HOME, app. VI at 333−43 (1912); THOMAS ELIOT, THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE COMMUNITY
173−75 (1914); Hon. William H. DeLacy, Functions of the Juvenile Court, 36 ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 61 (1910); Mack, supra note 19, at 116, 119–20.
86. Nackenoff & Sullivan, supra note 20, at 184–92.
87. BRECKINRIDGE & ABBOTT, supra note 85, 174.
88. TANENHAUS, supra note 19, at 74–75.
89. See, for example, Report of the Director (Grace Abbott), LEAGUE FOR THE PROTECTION
OF IMMIGRANTS, ANNUAL REPORT, 1909–1910, at 31.
90. Nackenoff, supra note 12, at 140–50.
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vulnerable urban newcomers. And dangerous homes and residential spaces
could further endanger the public.
IV. LEGACIES
Later generations of reformers also crafted social welfare policies that
intruded upon the home and of middle-class expectations of privacy in the
name of progress and the public interest. Welfare programs, including
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), “subordinate[]
recipients to a series of requirements, sanctions, and stacked incentives
aimed at rectifying their personal choices and family practices.” By
accepting welfare, “TANF recipients must surrender or compromise their
vocational freedom, sexual privacy, and reproductive choice, as well as the
right to make intimate decisions about how to be and raise a family.” 91
Further complicating privacy, homes were seen as posing potential
dangers because of their physical condition, layout, and location. 92
Substandard homes and urban blight were considered dangers to the public.
Progressive Era reformers and their New Deal heirs considered certain
qualities necessary to the very concept of “home.” The basic, adequate
home had certain prerequisites in terms of personal space and opportunities
for privacy, natural lighting, plumbing, heating, access to fresh air, yard
space, and other amenities. By the early 1920s, these standards were being
disseminated across the nation by Better Homes in America and local
chapters of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs. In the 1930s, they
were enshrined in home mortgage underwriting standards that disqualified
the overwhelming majority of then-existing urban residences from
mortgage insurance. 93
The Court continues to develop protections of the private realm. One
important recent declaration is found in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 94 part of the prelude to the right of
same-sex couples to marry: 95
Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
91. Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 79 (2001). See GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF
MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917–1942 (1996) for continuity in such
policies and their connection to maternalism.
92. See GWENDOLYN WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HOUSING IN
AMERICA 116–20 (1981).
93. James L. Greer, The Better Homes Movement and the Origins of Mortgage Redlining in
the United States, in STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS, supra note 20, at 203, 203−35.
94. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
95. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–605 (2015) (discussing cases involving
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberties “central to human dignity and autonomy”).
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choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.96
Should we uncritically accept this claim about the trajectory of privacy
and Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests at face value?
During the Progressive Era, some gained more privilege with
recognition of privacy rights, while public power was used to regulate the
bodies, behavior, homes, and lives of others. This tension involving “a
heightened American rhetoric of individual liberty with a constant and
historic readiness to employ the coercive state powers of regulation and
police” did not disappear with the constitutional celebration of liberty. 97 A
narrative that suggests privacy, equal protection, and constitutional
protection for a number of individual rights displaced the common law and
police power has serious limitations if it neglects the differential access of
persons under the jurisdiction of the laws of the state and the nation to
rights to be let alone.

96. 505 U.S. at 851 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
97. NOVAK, supra note 17, at 237.

